A report of the day when Gordon Brown went before the Iraq Inquiry by a Rugby STWC member

GORDON BROWN AT IRAQ INQUIRY 05/03/10

I attended the Chilcot Inquiry the day Gordon Brown appeared before it. Here is my report.

THE INVASION WAS THE RIGHT DECISION FOR THE RIGHT REASONS ACCORDING TO GORDON BROWN

• Saddam Hussein was not abiding by international law
• There is no alternative but to intervene where there are risks to the post Cold War world: state terrorists and rogue states/aggressive states like Iraq cause instability
• It is the message we send to other rouge states if nothing is done when diplomacy fails – the world becomes less safe – this was his main reason for supporting the invasion
• Intelligence evidence in March 2003 suggested Iraq was a threat
• He had been committed to the diplomatic route until then
• The problem was that some countries which had supported UN resolution 1441 would not support military action in any circumstances, so Britain had to act
• When it was put to him that UN Inspectors felt more time was needed, he argued diplomacy had been exhausted
• He made it clear none of the military options should be rejected on cost grounds
• He disagreed that diplomacy and containment should have lasted longer in order to resolve the Middle East peace process as ‘it was difficult to get agreement in the Middle East’

WAS GORDON BROWN SATISFIED THE INVASION OF IRAQ SATISFIED INTERNATIONAL LAW?

• He gave an unequivocal “Yes” – he was satisfied by the Attorney General’s advice that the invasion was lawful – the Attorney General had himself been unequivocal in his advice
• Replying to a question, he was not aware that advice from the Attorney General would have been different a couple of weeks earlier
• He would not have changed his mind even if he had known the Attorney General had changed his own mind because the Attorney General was so certain an invasion was legal, and Iraq was not responding to diplomacy
• The Attorney General’s advice was accepted by military chiefs
• He accepted he did not see the formal legal advice given to the Prime Minister in March
• He agreed that, in retrospect, history may want to look at the way the advice was given
• The Cabinet had made a collective – and correct – decision despite the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Attorney General being the only ones with all the knowledge – but he accepted Parliament could have been more involved, and would be in the future
• He was happy with the way Blair put the whole issue before Parliament
• He agreed it might have been different if the UN had been in a position to make a quick decision – but it could not do that because of the opposition of a number of countries on the UN Security Council. When pressed to explain which ones, he initially said Germany (which is not on the Security Council), then France
• The Cabinet had simply decided “Enough is enough” – Britain was defending the international community
• Everything Blair did was done properly – although he accepted that in future Parliament would require more information
• When told the UN Inspectors had felt more time was needed, he felt the Cabinet had made a judgement that enough was enough
• On ‘Regime Change’, which he was told Blair and Bush supported “if necessary”, but Jack Straw had said was unlawful and improper, he answered it became essential to change the regime, but that was not the aim to start with

HOW MUCH WAS BROWN, AS CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER AND A SENIOR GOVERNMENT MINISTER, AWARE OF EVENTS AS THEY UNFOLDED?

• He claimed he was regularly kept in the loop by Blair in ad-hoc discussions
• He would not answer whether he knew Blair was talking to Bush in 2002
• From June 2002, he started to discuss what would happen if diplomacy failed
• He claimed he only became aware of the decision to invade Iraq in March 2003
• He was not directly involved in discussions about whether sanctions were working, but he was kept informed
• As Chancellor he was aware of the military option
• When asked, he did not say whether the Cabinet had discussed the military option. He did say Cabinet had discussed diplomatic solutions as it was keen to avoid war
• When asked whether senior Cabinet Ministers had been adequately briefed, he said he had been in discussions the previous weekend, as well as there being financial discussions about possible alternatives
• Despite being a senior member of the Cabinet, he was not shown the Cabinet Office Review of Iraq Policy drawn up in March 2002, although he said he was aware of the issues

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

• At the time he was convinced WMDs were present
• Iraq had consistently refused to dismantle the weapons it was believed they possessed, a serious violation of international law
• He admitted he had received intelligence briefings on five occasions

BROWN’S WAR ROLE AS CHANCELLOR

• From June 2002 he had started to discuss what to do if diplomacy failed
• His view had always been that any military engagement must be without financial restraints – any military solution must be based on the best military option, whatever the financial cost
• Although Officials raised the issues of military costs, reconstruction costs and other financial implications, he had been keen that finance was not an issue in any decision
• He claimed the Treasury did not interfere on possible military options
• He stated that Chancellors did not traditionally sit on War Cabinets: his role was purely to ensure the funding was there for war once that became the option

POST INVASION PLANNING

• He said from the start that here lessons needed to be learnt. He had been pushing for such planning since June 2002, although a Planning Unit was not set up until Feb 2003
• He accepted Britain could not persuade the USA to take such planning seriously
• He only realised planning was defective after the event
• Britain should have moved more quickly to involve Iraqi people, and build up the Iraqi army, police, government and employment
• Delays in reconstruction were due to internal strife and the appearance of Al Queda after 2004
• Democracy can not just be ‘conjured up’
• When asked whether the USA’s failure to make planning for reconstruction a priority could have delayed the invasion, he did not answer.
• He accepted that the level of violence in Basra had held back reconstruction.
• The increase in Iraqi police and armed forces helped security and thus economic prosperity – the so-called ‘peace dividend’ – and this enabled Britain to reduce troop numbers.

• British businesses were encouraged to invest in Iraq and good trade relations were established with Iraq: the same needs to be done in Afghanistan.
• Britain did not want to be seen as occupiers and therefore withdrew their operational area from Basra Palace to the airport.
• He accepted there was a potential for corruption amongst the police in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
• When asked if British policy had really helped, when, after 7 years of terror, democracy remained fragile and the USA retained large numbers of troops there, he asked what would the alternative have been. Life has improved in terms of jobs, health, education and wealth from oil. He recognised that the price was the cost of life, saying ‘war may be necessary but tragic.’

THE COST OF THE WAR

• The initial estimate was £2.5 billion, which was revised to £4billion with one billion as a special reserve. The total cost ended up being £8 billion.
• The special reserve was for security and to counter terrorism – over 3 years this was raised from £1 – 3 billion.
• The total cost of reconstruction for the international community was £45 billion shared between Britain, USA, Iraqi resources and world institutions like the IMF.
• Every application for military resources was met and anything up to £10 million was approved without there having to be a process.
• The military were never turned down in any request for equipment.
• £90 million was provided when Snatch land rovers were requested.
• No limits were set on Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) and the forces were told to come back if they wanted any more.
• All this was in addition to the normal defence budget.
• He confirmed that the total cost of the war and reconstruction had risen from £8 to £9.2 billion. No cuts were made elsewhere to pay for it.
• In total, £17 – 18 billion had so far been spent on Iraq and Afghanistan with additional costs on pensions, compensation etc.
• More resources were needed as the insurgency increased.
• Spending depended on circumstances not known in advance.
• They had to adapt to circumstances including biological and chemical issues.
• The defence budget rose every year from 2001 and more was given than agreed in spending reviews.
• The MOD budget rose more than other departments in addition to what was given to Iraq.
• Involvement in Afghanistan at the same time as Iraq did not affect the Iraq budget.

CONCLUSION – GORDON BROWN’S FINAL REFLECTIONS

• He paid a full tribute to both the forces and civilians who died in the conflict, as he did at the start of the day.
• Difficult decisions were needed and the war divided public opinion.
• The decision to go to war was the right decision, but it is our duty to learn lessons.
• Europe and the USA must work closely together and develop international institutions to intervene when necessary.
• Instability is a constant worry, and we need internationally to be better prepared for reconstruction.

Pete McLaren Convenor, Rugby STWC 06/03/10